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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The

Supreme

Court

of Utah has jurisdiction

in this

case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (2) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Plaintiff's service of a summons and an amended

complaint on Defendant, Sunrise Title Co. three years after filing
the original complaint and 11 months after dismissing the action
against all other defendants meets the requirement of Rule 4(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that service be within 120 days
of filing or if co-defendants have been served then prior to trial?
2.

Was Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal premature when at the

time of its filing there was pending an unruled upon motion before
the trial court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The granting of a motion to dismiss is a question of law

and is reviewed for correctness. Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 987 P. 2d
602 (Utah 1999) .
2.

Whether the Notice of Appeal was properly filed is a

question of law for the appellate court.

Bonneville Billing &

Collection v Torres, 15 P.3d 112 (Ut. App. 2000).
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) states:
In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons
together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no
later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint
1

unless the court allows a longer period of time for good
cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice
on application of any party or upon the court's own
initiative. In any action brought against two or more
defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of
them within the 120 days or such longer period as may be
allowed by the court, the other or others may be served
or appear at any time prior to trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 14, 1998 Plaintiff sued Sharlene Bensen, R S West Real
Estate and Sunrise Title Company.

(R.3, Addendum 1). Sharlene

Bensen and R S West were immediately served. (R.ll, 20) Plaintiff
made no effort to serve the complaint on Sunrise Title Co.

Three

years later and after dismissing all co-defendants, Plaintiff filed
an amended complaint, changed the causes of action, and served the
amended complaint on Sunrise Title Co. (R.308, Addendum 2).

The

trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to serve
the amended complaint within the time required by Rule 4 (b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.327, Addendum 3 and 4) Plaintiff
appeals that order of dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The complaint, filed on July 14, 1998 by the Plaintiff,
alleged claims under Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11

(refund of sales

commission), breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent conspiracy.
(R.3)

Plaintiff immediately served the complaint on Sharlene

Bensen

and

R S West

Real

Estate,

(R.ll,

20) but

for

some

unexplained reason never served the complaint on Sunrise Title Co.

2

Defendants Sharlene Bensen and R S West Real Estate answered
the complaint, depositions

were taken and other discovery

completed during the next two years.

was

Defendants Sharlene Bensen

and R S West Real Estate then filed motions for summary judgment.
(R.40,

102)

The trial court

granted

the motions

for

summary

judgment dismissing all of Plaintiff's claims except the request
for refund

of the commission.

(R.238)

Plaintiff and

Sharlene

Bensen and R S West Real Estate then settled the remaining claim
and an order of dismissal dismissing with prejudice the action
against all defendants except Sunrise Title Co. was filed on June
22, 2000. (R.285)
Eleven months later on May 17, 2001, Plaintiff, without leave
of court, filed an amended complaint listing Sunrise Title Co. as
the only defendant and alleging new causes of action including
slander of title, fraud and negligence.
not name

nor make

reference

to

The amended complaint does

any co-defendant.

(R.308)

The

amended complaint was served on Sunrise Title Co. on May 18, 2001,
almost three years after the original complaint was filed and
eleven months after all other defendants were dismissed from the
case. (R.308)
Sunrise Title Co. filed a motion to dismiss claiming service
was

not

timely

under

Procedure. (R.279)
the

complaint

was

Rule

4 (b)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

The trial court granted that motion ruling that
not

served

within

3

120

days

from

when

the

complaint was filed and was not served until 11 months after all
other defendants and issues relating to those defendants had been
dismissed. (R.325, 327, Addendum 1 and 2).
Plaintiff then filed a motion to reconsider that ruling.

(R.

333) . Prior to the trial court ruling on the motion, the Plaintiff
filed his notice of appeal. (R.342)
rule

on

the

motion

because

jurisdiction in the case.

the

The trial court declined to
trial

(R. 347).

court

no

longer

had

Sunrise Title moved for

summary disposition of the appeal, as there was still pending
matters before the trial court.

This Court, by a ruling dated

January 25, 2002, deferred ruling on Appellee's motion for summary
disposition until further consideration.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. As of June 22, 2000, the date the case was dismissed
against all Defendants except Sunrise Title, there were no codefendants and no pending issues for trial. The amended complaint
listed no co-defendants or claims against co-defendants, since all
claims had been dismissed with prejudice.

The amended complaint,

which was filed and served some 11 months after there were no codefendants and no pending issues for trial, was properly dismissed.
2.

The Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the trial

court's dismissal of the amended complaint.

Prior to the trial

court ruling on that motion, the Plaintiff filed his notice of
appeal. Sunrise Title, by a Motion for Summary Disposition, raised

4

the issue of there being an unruled on motion before the trial
court.

This Court, in its Order dated January 25, 2002 did not

rule on the Motion for Summary Disposition but left that issue to
be determined after briefing.

If this Court does not sustain the

trial court's dismissal of the Amended Complaint, the appeal should
be dismissed and remanded to the trial court to rule on the motion
to reconsider.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS NOT SERVED WITHIN THE
TIME PERIOD REQUIRED BY U.R.C.P. 4(b) AND WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
a summons with a copy of the complaint be served within 120 days
after

filing

defendant.

the

complaint,

unless

there

is

more

than

one

In the event there are multiple defendants, if one

defendant is served within the 120 days, other co-defendants may be
served "any time prior to trial/'

For the co-defendant provision

to apply there must be a co-defendant and issues remaining for
trial when the defendant is served. Barber v. Emporium Partnership,
800 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1990).
Parties have a duty of timely and due diligence in service of
process.1

That duty "is imposed because of the strong

1

policy

Most jurisdiction's rules of civil procedure, including
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, place a time limit within
which service may be obtained. See Rule 4m of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requiring service within 120 days.
5

favoring prompt disposition of cases'7 and to avoid prejudice to
defendants because of unreasonable delays. Simmons v. State, 462
A.2d

974, 975

(R.I. 1983). Rule 4(b) of Utah's Rules of Civil

Procedure follows that policy by setting a 120 day time limit for
service, allowing an extension of time for good cause shown and
allowing service on co-defendants prior to trial.

The purpose of

allowing service on co-defendants prior to trial is to allow the
adding

of new defendants

after

the complaint

has been

filed.

Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. Eldon J. Stubbs Const., Inc.,714 P.2d 1142,
1143 (Utah 1986).
in the

case

and

Rule 4(b) requires that there be co-defendants
issues pending

for trial

to authorize

defendant to be served after the 120 day time limit.
Emporium

Partnership, the Court pointed out that

a co-

In Barber v.
co-defendants

could still be served since the "trial court only granted a partial
summary judgment" and therefore that was not a final disposition of
the case and there were issues pending against the co-defendants.
Id. at 798.
The State of Washington has a statute which has a similar
effect as Rule 4(b). 2

RCW 4.16.170 is interpreted to provide that

2

RCW4.16.170 provides that:
For the purpose of tolling any statute of limitations an action
shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed or summons
is served whichever occurs first. If service has not been had on
the defendant prior to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff
shall cause one or more of the defendants to be served
personally, or commence service by publication within ninety days
from the date of filing the complaint. If the action is
commenced by service on one or more of the defendants or by
6

if

one

defendant

is

served

within

90

days,

the

statute

of

limitations is tolled as to the other co-defendants even if they
are not served within the 90 days.
815 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1991).

Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc.,

In Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc. the

Washington court pointed out that:
While it is true that RCW 4.16.170, literally read, tolls
the statute of limitation for an unspecified period, that
period is not infinite.... Plaintiffs must proceed with
their cases in a timely manner as required by court
rules, and must serve each defendant in order to proceed
with the action against that defendant. A plaintiff who
fails to serve each defendant risks losing the right to
proceed against unserved defendants if the served
defendant is dismissed.
In Fox v. Sunmaster Products Inc., 821 P.2d 502

(Wash. Ct.

App. 1991), the Court discussed that statute in a case with facts
similar to the present case.

In Fox the amended complaint was

served on defendant Ladder Industries on June 10, 1987. Ladder was
dismissed 18 months later by summary judgment.

After Ladder was

dismissed, co-defendant Sunmaster Products was served on January
16, 1990, after the statute of limitation had run.

The court ruled

that since Ladder was dismissed before Sunmaster was served the
statute of limitation was not tolled.

publication, the plaintiff shall file the summons and complaint
within ninety days from the date of service. If following
service, the complaint is not so filed, or following filing,
service is not so made, the action shall be deemed to not have
been commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of
limitations.
7

Plaintiff's argument that it can serve Sunrise Title at any
time abuses the rule, prejudices Sunrise Title and is contrary to
the policy regarding timely service.

The Plaintiff would have this

Court interpret Rule 4(b) to allow him to settle all issues with
all co-defendants and dismiss them with prejudice from the case,
then wait a year, file an amended complaint (essentially a new law
suit) naming only Sunrise Title as a defendant and then serve
Sunrise Title some three years after the original complaint was
filed and after all statutes of limitations have expired.

Sunrise

Title is prejudiced by the long delay. Sunrise Title had no notice
of the lawsuit and was not involved in the discovery process nor
the dismissal of co-defendants with prejudice. Those defendants may
be liable for all or part of the damages claimed by Plaintiff.
To follow the Plaintiff's argument would allow absurd results.
What prevents any plaintiff whose claim is barred by a statute of
limitation from going to an old lawsuit in which the plaintiff is
a party, amending the complaint to add the barred claims and naming
new

defendants

and then

serving

the amended

circumventing the statute of limitation?

complaint

thereby

That is exactly what the

Plaintiff is attempting to do in this case.

The Plaintiff has

given no reason for not timely serving Sunrise Title.3

Plaintiff

could have served Sunrise Title at any time after the complaint was

3

The only apparent reason was to delay and prejudice Sunrise
Title and to settle with the other Defendants without the input
and influence of Sunrise Title.
8

filed up to the time the other defendants were dismissed, a period
of two years. Sunrise Title is a Utah corporation with a Utah agent
and an office in Roosevelt, Utah. There was no good reason for not
timely serving Sunrise Title and if there had been, Rule 4 allows
the court to extend the time of service for good cause shown.
Plaintiff's argument that Rules 54(b) and 71B(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure extend the time for service misconstrues
the language and purpose of those rules.

Those rules have no

application to Rule 4 (b) . Rule 54 (b) is the process used to appeal
a decision while other issues remain before the trial court.
Neither

of

the

co-defendants

have

requested

a

Rule

54(b)

certification and in fact the case against them was dismissed with
prejudice.

Rule 71B(b) is a process to bring a party before the

court using an order to show cause on a joint obligation when
judgment has been entered.

In this case there is no claim of a

joint obligation and the judgment entered was dismissal of the
defendants with prejudice.
Plaintiff had no legitimate reason for not timely serving
Sunrise Title with the original complaint.

The trial court ruled

properly that Rule 4 (b) only allows service after the 120 days
"when there are issues involving the co-defendants which are
pending before the court/' The Court should affirm the decision of
the trial court in this case.

9

ALTERNATIVELY THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL
COURT TO RULE ON PLAINTIFF'S PENDING MOTION
TO
RECONSIDER.
After the trial court entered its order dismissing the amended
complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider that ruling.
Sunrise Title filed its memorandum opposing the motion.
the trial court ruling on the motion, the Plaintiff
Notice of Appeal.

Prior to
filed his

The trial court declined to rule on the motion

because the trial court no longer had jurisdiction, the case having
been appealed.

Sunrise Title then filed a Motion for Summary

Disposition with this Court.

This Court deferred ruling on the

Motion for Summary Disposition "until further consideration."
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows an
appeal from a final order.

If there are post judgment motions the

notice of appeal must be filed after the order disposing of those
motions.

Utah R. App. P. 4b; See also Kay v. Summit Sys., 913 P.2d

349 (Utah 1996) and Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d 1051 (Ut. App. 1999).
The motion to reconsider filed by Plaintiff may be construed by the
trial court as a motion to alter or amend the judgment.
Billing

& Collection

v. Torres, 15 P.3d

112

Bonneville

(Ut. App.

2000).

Because that motion remains pending, the case should be remanded to
the trial court for ruling on that motion if this Court does not
sustain the trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint.

10

CONCLUSION
It is requested that the trial court's decision dismissing the
case be affirmed or in the alternative that the case be remanded to
the trial court to rule on the pending motion to reconsider.
Dated this

« day of July, 2002.
McKEACHNIE/i ALLRED,
M C C L E L L A N A J TROTTER, P.C.
Attorney^fpr Defendant/Appellee
By:

Cl|ark- / B A~lLred

By: A - J ^ y5b^'NrsC\dA-bjAAMA
G a y l e &.
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Clark B Allred, attorney for Defendant/Appellee certifies that
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two true and correct copies thereon in an envelop addressed to:
Mr. Daniel S. Sam
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319 West 100 South, Suite A
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and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
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DISTRICTCOURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

JUL 1 h 1998
JOANNE McKEE CLERK

BY

"TiOS

...DEPUTY

DANIEL S. SAM, #5865
Attorney for Plaintiff
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 8407 8
Telephone (435) 789-1301

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN HUNTER,
Plaintiff,
vs .

)

SHARLENE BENSEN; R S WEST REAL
ESTATE, a Utah real estate
agency; and SUNRISE TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah title insurance
agency,

I
;
]
)
)

Defendants.

C 0 M P L A I N T
Case No.

)

Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, hereby complains and
alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Brian Hunter, is an individual residing in Utah

County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant, Sharlene Benson

("Benson"),

is an

individual

residing in Uintah County, State of Utah, and is a licensed real
estate agent in the State of Utah.

Upon information and belief,

Benson has made application with the State of Utah to become a real
estate broker and may now be a licensed broker.
3.

At all times mentioned
1

herein, Benson was

employed

at

and/or sold real estate through Defendant, R S West Real Estate

("R

S West") as a licensed real estate agent.
4.

Defendant, R S West, is a Utah real estate agency having

its principal place of business at Roosevelt, State of Utah.
5.

Defendant, Sunrise Title Company ("Sunrise"), is a Utah

title insurance agency having its office and principal place of
business at Roosevelt, State of Utah.
6.

In about July 1995 Defendant, Benson, entered

into a

listing agreement with Mary Rowsell for the purpose of listing for
the sale price of $29,000.00

certain real property

located

in

Duchesne County, State of Utah, more specifically described as
follows:
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL BASE AND
MERIDIAN, SECTION 19: Beginning at a point 63 feet South
and 382 feet West of the Northeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter; thence North
63 feet; thence West 200 feet; thence South 300 feet;
thence Northeasterly 308 feet, more or less, to the point
of beginning.
7.

According the records in the Duchesne County Recorder's

Office, said property was purported to be owned by Mary Rowsell
("Rowsell").

Benson had

obtained

information following said listing.

said

records verifying

that

However, the Plaintiff had at

that time equitable title to the property which interest was not
recorded.
8.

Shortly after the listing agreement, Benson visited the
2

property to obtain information about the property for the listing
file.

While visiting the property, Benson met with Janet Hunter,

Plaintiff's wife who is now deceased.

Ms. Hunter informed Benson

that she and Plaintiff owned the property and that the property was
not for sale.
9.

Shortly after Benson's visit to the property, but prior to

July 26, 1995, attorney Joel Berrett, who was informed of the
unrecorded interest of Plaintiff, informed Benson of said interest
and that she should inform anyone interested in the property of
said interest or she could be sued.
10.

According

the

testimony

of

C.

Morgan

Glines

("Mr.

Glines"), a licensed title insurance agent for Defendant Sunrise,
made under oath in a deposition on or about December 6, 1995,
Benson approached Mr. Glines approximately two weeks prior to July
26, 1995, for the purpose of selling said property to him and
informed him

the price was

$29,000.00.

At

that

time, Benson

informed Mr. Glines that Rowsell owned the property and was the
person selling the property.

Mr. Glines informed Benson that he

was not interested at that price.
11.
that

the

Prior to July 26, 1995, Benson had obtained information
appraised

value

of

the

property

was

approximately

$45,000.00.
12.

Approximately two to three days prior to July 26, 1995,
3

after having spoken to Joel Berrett about Plaintiff's interest,
Benson again approached Mr. Glines and informed him that the price
of said property was now $19,000.00.
13.

On July 26, 1995, Benson entered into a Buyer Agency

Contract and Agency Disclosure with Mr. Glines for the purpose of
representing Mr. Glines in the purchase of said property.

On the

same date, Mr. Glines signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract for
the purpose

of making

an offer to purchase

said property

for

$19,000.00.
14.

On or about July 26, 1995, attorney Roland Uresk informed

Benson that the Plaintiff

asserted an unrecorded

claim to the

property and that his client, Ms. Rowsell, could convey title to
the property by Quit Claim Deed only.
15.

On July 26, 1995, Benson was present at a meeting at

Sunrise offices at 550 East 200 North, Roosevelt, Utah, where
Rowsell

signed a Warranty Deed conveying

said property

to Mr.

Glines and a HUD-1 settlement statement purporting to pay R S West
$1,140.00 as a commission and to pay Sunrise commissions and fees
in the amount of $495.00. The settlement statement was prepared by
Sunrise

and

falsely

represented

that

a

real

estate

sales

transaction occurred on that date involving the property and that
Mr. Glines paid in cash $19,023.65 to Sunrise as part of that
transaction.

In fact, Sunrise did not receive any cash from Mr.

4

Glines on that date.
16.

On August 9, 1995, attorney Roland Uresk sent a letter to

Sunrise through C. Morgan Glines and a copy of the letter to Benson
warning Sunrise not to record the Warranty Deed, demanding the
rescission of the transaction that purportedly occurred on July 26,
1995, and warning Sunrise that Ms. Rowsell will not be liable for
any legal costs arising from Plaintiff's claims.
17.

On August 11, 1995, C. Morgan Glines for Sunrise sent a

letter to Roland Uresk and a copy to Benson responding to Roland
Uresk's August 9, 1995, letter wherein Mr. Glines indicated that he
had reviewed Mr. Uresk's letter with the Broker of R S West Real
Estate and with Benson. Said response letter rejected Mr. Uresk's
letter and informed Mr. Uresk that the transaction would proceed.
18. On August 15, 1995, Sunrise obtained funds from Zions Bank
in the amount of $19,023.65 which were proceeds of a loan Mr.
Glines applied for on or about August 5, 1995.

Sunrise then, on

the same date, disbursed $1,140.00 to R S West Real Estate and
$495.00 to Sunrise from the proceeds of the Zions Bank loan and
recorded the Warranty Deed at the Duchesne County Recorder's
Office. Benson received a portion of the $1,140.00 commission paid
to R S West.
19.

In August: 1995, following the recording of the Warranty

Deed, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Mr. Glines and Vella R.
5

Glines to assert his claim to the property.

On November 20, 1997,

the Eighth Judicial District Court entered a Judgment in favor of
Plaintiff against Mr. Glines awarding the property to Plaintiff.
20.

Plaintiff expended in excess of $20,000.00 in costs and

attorney fees in said lawsuit to properly defend his title to the
property.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
21. Defendants, Benson and R S West Real Estate, are liable to
Plaintiff in an amount of up to three times the sale commission of
$1,140.00 as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17 (a) in that Benson
and R S West knew or should have known that Plaintiff had a valid
claim to the property and thereby have violated numerous provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11 by their conduct set forth above.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
22. Based on the above facts, Defendants owed a fiduciary duty
and/or other duties of care to Plaintiff in that Defendants knew or
should have known that Plaintiff had a valid claim to the property.
Defendants breached said duties of care by their participation in
the transaction described

above.

By reason of that breach,

Plaintiff incurred costs in defending title to the property in the
amount of at least $20,000.00 for which Defendants are liable.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
23. As set for above, Defendants, Benson and Sunrise, acted in
6

concert with one another in a scheme to defraud Plaintiff of his
title to the property. By reason thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to
reimbursement from said Defendants for costs and attorney fees
incurred

in defending

his

title

in the

amount

of

at

least

$20,000.00.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
24.

Defendants7, Benson and Sunrise, conduct constitutes

willful and malicious or intentionally

fraudulent conduct, or

conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and a disregard of, the rights of others within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1)(a).

By reason thereof Defendants, Benson

and Sunrise, are liable to Plaintiff for punitive damages in an
amount to be proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants
as follows:
1. As to the First Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be awarded
the statutory penalty provided in Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17(a)
against Defendants, Benson and R S West Real Estate, in an amount
of up to three times the sale commission paid to said Defendants of
$1,1040.00;
2.

As to the Second Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be

awarded damages against Defendants for breach of fiduciary and/or
other duties of care owed by Defendants to Plaintiff in the amount
7

of at least $20,000.00, to be proven at trial, plus interest, plus
costs and attorney's fees;
3. As to the Third Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be awarded
damages against Defendants, Benson and Sunrise, which resulted in
concerted fraudulent conduct in the amount of at least $20,000.00,
to be proven at trial, plus interest, plus costs and attorney's
fees ;
4. As to the Fourth Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be awarded
punitive

damages

against

Defendants,

Benson

and

Sunrise,

as

provided under Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 et seq;
5. That Plaintiff be awarded such other and further relief as
the Court deems proper.

3 an hunter com
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DANIELS SAM, #5865
DANIEL S SAM, P C
Attorney for Plaintiff
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone (435) 789-1301

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN HUNTER,
)

Plaintiff,

])

vs

i

AMENDED COMPLAINT

]

SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant

]
]1

Case No 980000102CV

]1

Judge A Lynn Payne

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Daniel S Sam, and for cause of
action against the Defendant complains and alleges as follows
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1

Plaintiff, Brian Hunter, is an individual residing in Clark County, State of Nevada.

2

Defendant, Sunrise Title Company ("Sunrise"), is a Utah corporation, having its office

and principal place of business at Roosevelt, Duchesne County, State of Utah, and is duly authorized
to conduct business in the state of Utah as a title insurance agency

1

3.

Jurisdiction of this Court is proper in this Court under Section 78-3-4( 1), Utah Code

Annotated
4
Annotated

Venue of this action is properly in this Court under Section 78-13-7, Utah Code
The Defendant's principal place of business is in Duchesne County and the conduct

giving rise to Plaintiffs claims occurred within Duchesne County, Utah.
FACTS
5

In about July 1995, RS West Real Estate Agency, and or its agents (collectively "RS

West"), entered into a listing agreement with Mary Rowsell for the purpose of listing for the sale
price of $29,000 00 certain real property (the "Property") located in Duchesne County, State of Utah,
more specifically described as follows.
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL BASE AND
MERIDIAN, SECTION 19 Beginning at a point 63 feet South and 382 feet West
of the Northeast corner of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter; thence
North 63 feet, thence West 200 feet, thence South 300 feet, thence Northeasterly 308
feet, more or less, to the point of beginning.
6.

According the records in the Duchesne County Recorder's Office, the Property was

purported to be owned by Mary Rowsell ("RowseHM). RS West had obtained said records verifying
that information following said listing However, the Plaintiff had at that time equitable title in fee
of the Property which interest was not recorded.
7

C Morgan Glines ("Mr Glines"), a licensed title insurance agent for Defendant

Sunrise, is a principal, officer, and shareholder of Sunrise

2

8

On or about December 6, 1995, Mr Glines testified under oath in a deposition given

in Hunter v. GImes, Eighth Judicial District Court for Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department, Case
Number 950000136 (the "Hunter v. GImes lawsuit"), that approximately two weeks prior to July 26,
1995, he learned from RS West that Rowsell was selling the Property for the price was $29,000 00
Mr GImes informed RS West that he was not interested at that price
9

Mr Glines resides on real property adjacent to the Property and knew that the

Plaintiff, Plaintiffs wife and minor children, at the times relevant herein, were residing on the
Property
10

Mr Glines had reason to believe that the appraised value of the Property at that time

was approximately $45,000 00
11

Approximately two to three days prior to July 26, 1995, Mr Glines was informed that

Rowsell was now willing to sell the Property for $19,000 00, far below the appraised value and the
original listing price
12

Pi ior to July 26, 1995, attorney Joel Berrett informed Mr Glines, via telephone, that

Plaintiff claimed equitable title to the Property
13

On July 26,1995, Mr Glines signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract for the purpose

of making an offer to purchase the Property from Rowsell foi $19,000 00
14.

On or about July 26, 1995, attorney Roland Uresk informed RS West that the Plaintiff

asserted an unrecorded claim to the Property and that his client, Rowsell, could convey title to the

3

property by Quit Claim Deed only.
15

On or about July 26, 1995, RS West informed Mr. Glines that there might be a

problem with the title to the Property involving the unrecorded claim of the Plaintiff.
16

On July 26, 1995, Sunrise arranged the closing of the sale of the Property from

Rowsell to Mr. Glines. Mr. Glines as well as other shareholders, officers and/or employees of Sunrise
and Rowsell were present at the closing at Sunrise's offices located at 550 East 200 North,
Roosevelt, Utah, where Rowsell signed a Warranty Deed (the "Warranty Deed") conveying the
Property to Mr. Glines and a HUD-1 settlement statement purporting to pay Sunrise commissions
and fees in the amount of $495.00.
17

The settlement statement was prepared by Sunrise and falsely represented that a real

estate sales transaction occurred on that date involving the Property and that on July 26, 1995, Mr.
Glines paid $19,023.65 in cash to Sunrise as part of that transaction. In fact, Sunrise did not receive
any cash from Mr. Glines on that date. Sunrise also prepared the Warranty Deed.
18

On August 9, 1995, attorney Roland Uresk sent a letter to Sunrise through Mr. Glines

warning Sunrise not to record the Warranty Deed, demanding the rescission of the transaction that
purportedly occurred on July 26, 1995, and warning Sunrise that Ms. Rowsell will not be liable for
any legal costs arising from Plaintiffs claims.
19.

On August 11, 1995, Mr. Glines, on behalf of Sunrise, sent a letter to Roland Uresk

responding to Roland Uresk's August 9, 1995, letter wherein Mr. Glines indicated that he had

4

reviewed Mr. Uresk's letter. Said response letter rejected Mr. Uresk's letter and informed Mr. Uresk
that the transaction would proceed.
20

On August 15, 1995, Sunrise obtained funds from Zions Bank in the amount of

$19,023.65 which were proceeds of a loan Mr. Glines applied for on or about August 5, 1995.
Sunrise then, on the same date, from the proceeds of the Zions Bank loan, disbursed $495.00 to
Sunrise, paid the underlying mortgage on the Property, retained $2,000.00. from RowselPs proceeds
for litigation expenses which Sunrise perceived would arise as a result of its settlement of this
transaction, and paid the balance in the amount of $929.93 to Rowsell as her sales proceeds. These
disbursement checks were signed by Mr. Glines on behalf of Sunrise.
21.

On August 14, 1995, Sunrise recorded the Warranty Deed at the Duchesne County

Recorder's Office.
22.

In August 1995, following the recording of the Warranty Deed, Plaintiff filed the

Hunter v. Glines lawsuit against Mr. Glines and Vella R. Glines to assert his claim to the property.
On November 20, 1997, the Eighth Judicial District Court entered a Judgment in favor of Plaintiff
against Mr. Glines awarding the Property to Plaintiff.
23.

Plaintiff expended in excess of $20,000.00 in costs and attorney fees in the Hunter v.

(/lines lawsuit to properly defend his title to the Property against Mr. Glines because of the actions
taken by Mr. Glines and Sunrise Title.

5

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
[Breach of Fiduciary Duty]
24.

Plaintiff by this reference incorporates in this First Cause of Action each of the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 23 of this Complaint.
25.

Sunrise is a licensed independent escrow agent through the Utah State Insurance

Department and is thus subject to the provisions of Title 7, Chapter 22, Utah Code Annotated.
26.

Under the provisions of Section 7-22-108(2), Sunrise owed a statutorily imposed

fiduciary duty to Plaintiff.
27.

Sunrise breached its fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff by preparing the Warranty Deed,

by allowing and encouraging Rowsell to sign it, and by recording it.
28.

As a direct and proximate result of Sunrise's conduct, Plaintiff incurred special

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00
together with prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment
interest at the statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's, plus punitive damages under
Section 78-18-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
[Slander of Title]
29.

Plaintiff by this reference incorporates in this Second Cause of Action each of the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint.

6

30

The Warranty Deed prepared by Sunrise was known to the Sunrise to be a defamatory,

fraudulent and slanderous document with respect to the property and with respect to Plaintiffs
interest therein
31

Sunrise, knowing that the Warranty Deed was defamatory, fraudulent and slanderous

to the property, knowingly caused the Warranty Deed to be recorded in the Duchesne County
Recorder's Office, thus forcing Plaintiff to bring an action clearing title.
32

As a direct and proximate result of Sunrise's conduct, Plaintiff incurred special

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00
together with prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment
interest at the statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's, plus punitive damages under
Section 78-18-1, et seq , Utah Code Annotated.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
[Fraudl
33

Plaintiff by this reference incorporates in this Third Cause of Action each of the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 32 of this Complaint.
34.

Sunrise knew that the Warranty Deed which it prepared was false and fraudulent

because Sunrise knew that Mr. Glines was not a bona fide purchaser, knew that Rowsell could not
convey title to the Property by Warranty Deed, and knew of Plaintiffs unrecorded interest Sunrise
thus knew that the Warranty Deed would only result in litigation between the Plaintififand Mr Glines.
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35

Sunrise knowingly caused the Warranty Deed to be recorded.

36

As a direct and proximate result of Sunrise's conduct, Plaintiff incurred special

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00
together with prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment
interest at the statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's, plus punitive damages under
Section 78-18-1, et seq , Utah Code Annotated.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
[Negligence]
[In the Alternative to the First through Third Causes of Action]
37

Plaintiff by this reference incorporates in this Fourth Cause of Action each of the

allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 of this Complaint.
38

Sunrise owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff in that Sunrise knew or had reason to

know that Plaintiffhad a valid unrecorded claim on the Property, and that Sunrise was in a position
where it could and did harm Plaintiffs interest in the Property.
39

Sunrise breached its duty of care to the Plaintiff in that it negligently proceeded with

the sales transaction in a manner in which Sunrise reasonable could and did foresee that Plaintiff
would incur substantial expenses in defending his rights to the Property as a direct and proximate
result of Sunrise's conduct
40.

As a direct and proximate result of Sunrise's conduct, Plaintiff incurred special

8

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00
together with prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at leastl 0% per annum, plus post judgment
interest at the statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's as allowed by law.
WIIFRFFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Sunrise as follows:
1.

As to the First Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be awarded special damages in an

amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00 together with
prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment interest at the
statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's, plus punitive damages under Section 7818-1, et seq , Utah Code Annotated;
2.

As to the Second Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be awarded special damages in an

amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00 together with
prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment interest at the
statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's, plus punitive damages under Section 7818-1, et seq , Utah Code Annotated;
3.

As to the Third Cause of Action, that Plaintiff be awarded special damages in an

amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00 together with
prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment interest at the
statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's, plus punitive damages under Section 7818-1, et seq , Utah Code Annotated;
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4.

As to the Fourth Cause of Action, that PlaintifTbe awarded Plaintiff incurred special

damages in an amount to be proven at trial, general damages consisting of at least $20,000.00
together with prejudgment interest thereon at a rate of at least 10% per annum, plus post judgment
interest at the statutory rate, plus costs of suit and reasonable attorney's as allowed by law;
5.

That PlaintifTbe awarded such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

DATED this ! ^> day of May, 2001.

DANIEL S. SAM

\ lumici 2 com
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In The Eighth Judicial District Court Of Duchesne County
State of Utah
BRIAN HUNTER,
RULING
Plaintiff,
v.
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation.
Defendant.

CASE NO.980000102

On Sept. 13, 2001, the Court entered it's Ruling on the Defendant's (Sunrise Title
Company) Motion to Dismiss. In it's Ruling the Court noted that the Defendant had not
replied to the response of Brian Hunter. The Defendant has now filed a Motion to Reconsider
based upon the fact that the Defendant had filed a reply which the Court had not reviewed.
It is obvious that the reply was timely filed and should have been considered by the
Court. Therefore, the Motion to Reconsider is granted. In it's reply the Defendant points to
the fact that all issues relating to the Co-Defendants, (Benson and R.S. West) were fully
resolved prior to service upon Sunrise. Defendant points out that the language of Rule 4(b)
only provides for service on Sunrise beyond 120 days if Sunrise is served prior to trial. The
Defendant's point is well taken. All issues involving the Co-Defendants (Benson and R. S.
West) had been fully resolved prior to service on Sunrise.
Rule 4(b) only allows for service upon a co-defendant beyond 120 days when there are
issues involving co-defendants which are pending before the Court. Therefore, the Court will

set aside it's Sept. 13, 2001 Ruling and grant the Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this

K day of Oct., 2001.

A. Lynn Payne, District Court Judge

Mailing Certificate
, ,
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, on the ty day
of Oct., 2001, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
Daniel S. Sam
319 West 100 South, Suite A
Vernal, UT 84078
Clark B. Allred
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, UT 84028

4u?i\yi<

Deputy Court Clerk

y
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GAYLE F McKEACHNIE - 2200
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant, Sunrise Title Company
121 West Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (435) 789-4908
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

BRIAN HUNTER,

ORDER
Plaintiff,

vs
Civil No. 980000102
SUNRISE TITLE COMPANY,
Judge: A. Lynn Payne
Defendant
The above captioned matter came before the Court for ruling
on Defendant, Sunrise Title Company's Motion to Reconsider Motion
to Dismiss on Basis that Reply Memorandum had been Filed and
Request for Oral Argument.

The Court previously ruled on the

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and noted that no Reply Memorandum
supporting the Motion to Dismiss had been filed.

The Court after

further review of the file determined that a Reply Memorandum in
Support of the Motion to Dismiss had been timely filed and that
it contained argument and information important to the Court's
consideration of the Motion to Dismiss.

The Court therefore

granted the Motion to Reconsider, reviewed the pleadings and the
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss and the Court entered its Ruling on October 2, 2001.
Based thereon the Court finds and orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff filed this action on July 14, 1998 naming as

Defendants, Sharlene Benson, R.S. West Real Estate and Sunrise
Title Company.
2.

Defendants Sharlene Benson and R.S. West Real Estate

were served shortly after the complaint was filed.

Both

Defendants filed answers, discovery was undertaken and Motions
for Summary Judgement were filed.

Defendant Sunrise Title

Company was not served with the Summons or Complaint.
3.

The Court dismissed part of the claims against

Defendants, Sharlene Bensen and R.S. West Real Estate and then
the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the other claims.
4.

On June 22, 2000 all claims against Sharlene Benson and

R.S. West Real Estate were dismissed.

Defendant Sunrise Title

Company had not been served with the Summons and Complaint.
5.

On May 17, 2001, five days short of 11 months later,

the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, without leave of court,
which stated different causes of action than in the original
complaint.

That amended complaint with the summons were served

on Defendant, Sunrise Title Company on May 18, 2001.
6.

Defendant Sunrise Title Company responded by filing a

Motion to Dismiss based on Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the time of service.
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the
summons and complaint be served within 120 days or upon a codefendant prior to trial.

Rule 4(b) only allows service later

than the 120 days upon a co-defendant when there are issues
involving the co-defendants which are pending before the court.
In this case all co-defendants had been dismissed on June 22,
2000.

Defendant, Sunrise Title Company was not served with the

amended complaint until May 18, 2001.
Since Defendant, Sunrise Title Company was not served within
120 days after filing of the complaint and was not served until
11 months after all other co-defendants were dismissed the Court
hereby ORDERS THAT:
Defendant, Sunrise Title Company is dismissed with out
prejudice.
Dated this

^ff

day October 2001

J0$$ %*District Judge

